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DISCHARGE OF SUPERVISORS HELD LAWFUL REGARDLESS
OF INTENDED EFFECT ON EMPLOYEE RIGHTS: PARKER-
ROBB OVERRULES PATTERN OF CONDUCT THEORY
INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act of 19351 was amended in
1947 expressly to exclude supervisors2 from its purview. As such,
supervisors are not afforded the same protections as other employ-
ees,3 and they may be discharged for engaging in union activity.4
Accordingly, the National Labor Relations Board as a general rule
will find no violation of the Act when a supervisor is discharged.
An important exception to this rule developed as a result of the
1967 Pioneer Drilling Co.5 case in which the Board found that the
discharge of a supervisor was effectively used to terminate other
employees who were engaged in union activity.' In this landmark
case, the board held that this discharge was a violation of the Act
because it interfered with the protected rights of the non-supervi-
sory employees.
Over the next fifteen years the Board developed guidelines
whereby a violation would be found, and reinstatement ordered,
when the discharge of a supervisor was an integral part of an em-
ployer's overall pattern of conduct aimed at penalizing employees
for their union activities. 7 In each of these "pattern of conduct"
1. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 342, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as NLRA].
2. A supervisor is defined as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, trans-
fer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline
other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or
effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but re-
quires the use of independent judgment.
Id. § 2(11); 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
3. Id. § 14(a); 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). For the text of NLRA § 14(a), see infra note
13.
4. See, e.g., Hook Drugs, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 189 (1971); Royal Fork Inc., 179 N.L.R.B.
185 (1969).
5. 162 N.L.R.B. 918 (1967), enforced in pertinent part, 391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968).
6. Id. at 928, 391 F.2d at 964. See also infra text accompanying notes 22-24.
7. See generally infra text accompanying notes 22-45.
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cases, the Board inquired into the employer's motive to see
whether the discharge was motivated by the legitimate desire of
assuring the loyalty of management personnel, or by the unlawful
desire of coercing employees in the exercise of their protected
rights.8 In Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc.,9 decided in June 1982, the
Board overruled this entire line of authority and held that since
supervisors are not protected by the Act, their discharge does not
constitute a violation of the Act regardless of the employer's mo-
tive or any coercive effect on the employees' exercise of their statu-
tory rights.
This Comment focuses on the rationale behind the "pattern of
conduct" theory and its effort to protect the rights of employees.
The Parker-Robb decision is criticized for its assertion that the
pattern of conduct cases were merely an indirect way of bringing
supervisors under the protection of the Act. Through an overre-
liance on the fact that supervisors are excluded from the protec-
tions of the Act, Parker-Robb completely ignored those situations
where the employer can effectively use the supervisory discharge as
8. See, e.g., DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 828 (1980), where the Board held that § 8(a)(1)
was violated when an employer discharged a pro-union supervisor and then used this as an
example and a threat to the rank-and-file employees as to what would happen to them if
they engaged in union activity.
9. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 110 L.R.R.M. 1289 (June 23, 1982), petition for review denied
sub nom. Automobile Salesmen's Union v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In denying
the petition for review of the Board's decision, the D.C. Circuit held that the Board had
acted within the bounds of its authority in reversing its policy and that its decision was
therefore not subject to review by the court. The court made it clear that it was not passing
on the merits of the Board's decision when it stated: "[T]he standard of review in this case
is quite narrow. The Board's construction of the Act must be enforced if it is reasonably
defensible, even if the court might prefer a different interpretation." 711 F.2d at 385. The
court further stated that the Board should only be reversed if its construction has no rea-
sonable basis in law, is fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act, or moves
into a new area of regulation which Congress has not committed to it. Id. at 386. The court
felt that the Board's construction was not vulnerable on any of these grounds, and it was
therefore compelled to affirm the Board. The court held that the Board's decision in this
case was a reasonable exercise of its discretion, and it found comfort in the fact that the
Board explained in full detail why it decided to change course. Id. at 388. Accordingly, the
petition for review was denied.
Parker-Robb now stands as the governing authority for supervisory discharge cases
brought before the Board. The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged this
fact in Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 103 S.Ct. 1453 (1983). Parker-
Robb is recognized by the majority in this case. Id. at 1460, n.9. It is also quoted by the
dissent and utilized for the proposition that the discharge of a supervisor who is active in a
union is not unlawful since supervisors do not have rights protected by the Act. Id. at 1466
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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a means of interfering with the protected rights of the rank-and-
file employees. 10
Where the employer's true motive cannot be immediately as-
certained from the facts surrounding the supervisor's discharge,
this Comment proposes that a formal motive test be used to deter-
mine whether a violation has occurred. In virtually all cases the
employer will be able to come up with some legitimate motive for
the discharge, and in many cases the employer's actions will in fact
have been motivated at least in part by legitimate concerns. Be-
cause of this, it is proposed that a dominant motive test, with a
shifting burden of proof standard, be employed by the Board in all
such cases.
Finally, this Comment will discuss the reasons why, in most of
these cases, reinstatement of the discharged supervisor is the ap-
propriate remedy when violations are found.
I. THE PATTERN OF CONDUCT CASES
In response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,11 which held that supervisors
were entitled to the protections of the National Labor Relations
Act, Congress amended the Act in 1947 expressly to exclude super-
10. It is a violation of §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act for an employer to interfere with or
coerce employees in the exercise of their protected right to engage in union activity. For the
text of these sections, see infra note 16. An employer can, however, effectively use the dis-
charge of a supervisor to interfere directly with employee rights in a number of ways. For
example, if the employer has a pro-union supervisor he can discharge him for the purpose of
holding this out as an example to the employees of what will happen to them if they engage
in union activity. This can be a very effective means of curbing the union activity of many
employees. See, e.g., DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. at 828; see also infra text accompanying
notes 36-45. The employer also may abuse certain customs or peculiarities of an industry
and indirectly terminate union-active employees by discharging their supervisor. See, e.g.,
Pioneer Drilling, 162 N.L.R.B. at 918; see also infra text accompanying notes 22-24. Alter-
natively, the employer may choose to discharge one or more supervisors (and perhaps other
employees also) contemporaneously with the discharges of union-active employees in an at-
tempt to cover up these unlawful discharges. While these are just a few of the many possible
examples, they suffice to show that it is very possible for an employer to use supervisors and
supervisory discharges to interfere effectively and directly with the union activity of
employees.
11. 330 U.S. 485 (1947). This 5-4 decision upheld the Board's decision in Packard Mo-
tor Car Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 1212 (1945). The Supreme Court construed the term "employer" as
not to include foremen or supervisors. NLRA § 2(2) reads: "The term 'employer' includes
any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly ... " NLRA § 2(2);
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976).
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visors from its coverage. 12 The principal reason for this legislation
was the desire to guarantee employers the right to demand total
loyalty from their supervisors. 13 Union membership was considered
inconsistent with such loyalty since unionized supervisors would be
subject to influence and control by the rank-and-file, 14 thus depriv-
ing employers of the "undivided loyalty" of their management
personnel.15
Supervisors are consequently left unprotected by the Act. Un-
like the rank-and-file employees, supervisors remain under the
concept of employment-at-will, and employers may discharge them
for engaging in union activity, or for any other reason, or for no
reason at all, without violating the Act. However, a number of nar-
row areas have developed where the discharge of a supervisor is
held to violate the Act because it directly interferes with the pro-
tected employees' section 7 rights to engage in union activity. 16 Ac-
cordingly, a supervisor may not be discharged for refusing to com-
mit unfair labor practices,17 for falling to prevent unionization,18 or
12. See NLRA §§ 2(3), 2(11), and 14(a); 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), and 164(a) (1976).
These sections define the term "supervisor," and state that supervisors are not employees
and are accordingly outside the scope of the Act.
13. See H.R. RaP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEG-
ISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 305 (1948). A second
stated reason for excluding supervisors from the Act was a concern that allowing supervisors
to unionize would be inconsistent with the policy of assuring workers freedom from control
by their supervisors in their organizing and bargaining activities. Id. However, it seems un-
likely that the anti-union Congress of 1947 actually had this goal in mind. The actual lan-
guage of the amendments support this assertion since supervisors are not forbidden from
joining unions, but merely are denied the Act's protections. Section 14(a) of the Act states:
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from be-
coming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject
to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as su-
pervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relat-
ing to collective bargaining.
14. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLA-
Ti HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr, 1947, at 305 (1948).
15. S. RzP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 411 (1948).
16. Section 7 of the Act states: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection. .....
Section 8(a)(1), makes it "an unfair labor practice for an employer" to "interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
17. Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1359 (1963), enforced in pertinent
part, 341 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1965); Vail Mfg. Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 181 (1945), enforced, 158 F.2d
[Vol. 32320
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for giving testimony adverse to an employer's interest at an NLRB
proceeding or during the processing of an employee's grievance
under the collective bargaining agreement.19
These exceptions show the Board has recognized that, while
supervisors owe a duty of loyalty to their employers, they also have
a duty, as do their employers, to act in accordance with the law
and to respect the rights guaranteed to employees by the Act. Su-
pervisors must be allowed to perform their duties without fear of
reprisal for refusing to violate the law.20 Otherwise supervisors
would be forced to decide between unlawfully interfering with em-
ployee rights or risking the loss of their job. Given this choice, it is
not unreasonable to assume that the degree of interference with
employees' protected rights would increase, as would the number
of grievances filed with the NLRB. Clearly, this is not what Con-
gress had in mind when it amended the Act to exclude
supervisors. 2'
The pattern of conduct line of cases developed out of this pol-
icy of finding supervisory discharges unlawful when they interfere
with employees' protected rights. The initial case in this line was
Pioneer Drilling, Co.,2 2 decided by the NLRB in 1967. The Board
found that the employer discharged two drillers who were supervi-
sors in order to take advantage of the drilling industry custom that
when a driller is terminated, his crew likewise is terminated. It also
found that this action was taken to eliminate union activity which
was centered in these crews. 23 The Board therefore held this to be
664 (7th Cir. 1947).
18. Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 295 (1953), enforced, 213 F.2d 209
(5th Cir. 1954).
19. Rohr Indus., Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1975); Ebasco Servs., Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 768
(1970); Oil City Brass Works, 147 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964), enforced, 357 F.2d 466 (5th Cir.
1966); Better Monkey Grip Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1170 (1956), enforced, 243 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1957).
20. See Oil City Brass Works, 357 F.2d at 471.
21. Congress amended the Act to allow employers to demand loyalty from their super-
visors, and to give employers the right to discharge supervisors who engaged in union activ-
ity. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. However, Congress by these actions did
not grant employers the legal power to use supervisors to infringe upon the protected rights
of employees. The amendments merely excluded supervisors from the coverage of the Act.
There is nothing to suggest that they in any way lessened the degree of protection afforded
by the Act to the rights of covered employees.
22. 162 N.L.R.B. 918 (1967), enforced in pertinent part, 391 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1968).
23. Even though these supervisor-drillers had engaged in union activity and had signed
union authorization cards, and even though the employer had a legitimate business reason
1983]
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a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their section 7
rights to engage in union activity. Reinstatement of the discharged
supervisors and their crews was ordered. The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, stating the employer's acts were not motivated by the pro-
union activities of the supervisors, but by those of the employees.
Therefore, the supervisors were not the object, but rather a con-
duit of the employer's unlawful acts, namely the squelching of pro-
tected union activity by the employees. 4
In 1972, in Krebs & King Toyota, Inc.,25 the Board expanded
the rationale of Pioneer and held that the discharge of a supervisor
was unlawful where it was "an integral part of a pattern of conduct
aimed at penalizing employees for their union activities. '26 Subse-
quent cases further expanded this pattern of conduct rationale. In
Fairview Nursing Home,27 the Board held that the discharge of a
supervisor was unlawful where it was an important part in the em-
ployer's strategy designed to rid itself of the union.28 Then, in
for taking such action, the Board held that these justifications were no more than a pretext
for getting rid of the union-active crews of these respective drillers by abusing the industry's
custom. Id. at 963.
The reasons given by the Board for finding these justifications a mere pretext were:
(1) those hired to replace the supervisors were not required to transfer to another city as
the supervisors had been ordered to (their refusal leading to their termination); (2) the
union activity was centered in these two crews; and (3) these two supervisors were later
rehired by Pioneer after the crews were released, despite their continued refusal to transfer.
Id. at 963-64.
24. Id. at 963.
25. 197 N.L.R.B. 462 (1972).
26. Id. at 463 n.4. In Krebs, employees of an automobile dealership were on strike when
the president of the company asked the supervisor of the body shop if he was coming back
to work. The supervisor responded that he wanted to come back immediately if the com-
pany would "let the Board settle it." Id. at 462. The supervisor was then told to look for a
new job because the body shop was being closed. The Board found that by discharging the
supervisor (whom the president knew was speaking for the striking body shop employees),
the employer effectuated his unlawful decision to close the body shop operation because of
the employees' union adherence. Id. at 462-63. Also, when the strike ended, the employer
took back all of the striking auto workers except for the body shop employees, and he con-
tinued to subcontract the body shop work. As such, the supervisor's discharge can be seen as
similar to the one in Pioneer.
27. 202 N.L.R.B. 318 (1973). The discharge of two supervisors occurred in connection
with the discharge of some 42 employees, all because they signed union cards. Although the
supervisors had also signed union cards, there was no evidence that the employer had
knowledge of this. Id. at 324 n.34.
28. The Board also gave consideration to the fact that these supervisory discharges had
the tendency of chilling employee rights because the employees would fear they would be
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Donelson Packing Co., 29 the Board held that a supervisor's dis-
charge was unlawful where it was closely tied to the unlawful dis-
charge of an employee, as this made it an "important element in
the . . . [employer's] total strategy designed to rid itself of the
union." 30 Again focusing on the motive of the employer, as it did in
all of the pattern of conduct cases, the Board in VADA of
Oklahoma, Inc.31 held unlawful a supervisory discharge effected in
order to coerce the employees and chill their rights, rather than to
punish the supervisor for his union activities.3 2
Throughout the pattern of conduct cases the Board's emphasis
was on protecting the rights of employees; it was not attempting
indirectly to bring supervisors under the protection of the Act. 3
This assertion was manifested in a number of alleged pattern of
conduct cases in which the Board held the supervisory discharge
lawful after finding that it did not interfere with employee rights. 4
subjected to the same reprisal if they engaged in union activity. Id.
29. 220 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1975), enforced, 569 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1978).
30. Although the employer had knowledge of the supervisor's pro-union sympathies,
the supervisor's discharge was nevertheless held unlawful because it occurred at the start of
the employer's anti-union campaign, because it was in part due to his attempt to procure
the reinstatement of the unlawfully discharged employee, and because it was, in general,
part of the employer's pattern of conduct involving flagrant unfair labor practices. Id. at
1043.
31. 216 N.L.R.B. 750 (1975).
32. The supervisor in question had warned an employee who was a union organizer that
the plant owner would try to make him quit by giving him unpleasant work. After a series of
events, the plant was shut down, and 38 employees, including the supervisor, were laid off.
Since the employer had a suspicion that the supervisor was involved in the union campaign,
the Board held that the employer fired him in order to coerce employees and chill them in
the exercise of their rights. Id. at 759.
33. The Board articulated this distinction most clearly in DRW Corp., when it stated:
The Board has never held that supervisory participation in concerted or union
activity is protected. Rather, reinstatement of supervisors in these cases has
been ordered only when, and precisely because, the respondent's action is found
to have been motivated, not by the supervisor's own activity, but by a desire to
stifle employees' excercise of section 7 rights and is part of an overall scheme
designed to achieve successfully that result.. . . [V]indication of employees' sec-
tion 7 rights, not protection of supervisors engaging in union or concerted activ-
ity, is the basis for a finding that a respondent has violated section 8(a)(1) and
that the circumstances require reinstatement of the discharged supervisor.
248 N.L.R.B. at 1509.
34. See, e.g., Stop and Go Foods, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1979) (after discharging su-
pervisor and unlawfully discharging all store employees, the employer asked the employees
back and tried to minimize any possible coercive effect on them due to the supervisor's
discharge by talking individually with each of them); Long Beach Youth Center, Inc., 230
N.L.R.B. 648 (1977) (discharge of supervisor for siding with employees in economic dispute
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For there to be a violation there had to be some showing that the
discharge was aimed at penalizing employees or interfering with
their rights. If the discharge was intended to punish the supervisor
for being disloyal and engaging in union activity, then there was no
violation of the Act."5
The Board made its final definitive statement upholding the
pattern of conduct rationale in DRW Corp.,3 6 decided in 1980.
There, a supervisor and an employee who both played significant
roles in a union-organizing campaign were discharged. During the
next few weeks the employer's officials made a point of announcing
that these two were fired for their union activities, that the other
employees would be discharged if they joined the union, and that
the plant would be closed if the employees chose to have the union
represent them. The Board held that, along with other violations,
the discharge of the supervisor violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.37
It held that an employer may discharge a supervisor out of a legiti-
mate desire to assure the loyalty of its management personnel, if
the action is "reasonably adapted" to that end.38 However, when
an employer engages in a widespread pattern of misconduct
against employees, including numerous unfair labor practices, and
the discharge of a supervisor occurs in this context, the evidence
may be sufficient to warrant a finding that the employer's actions
were motivated by a desire to discourage union activities among its
employees in general .3 This would violate the Act since it consti-
tutes a part of a pattern of conduct aimed at coercing employees in
the exercise of their section 7 rights.40
The Board further held that when a pro-union supervisor is
discharged in this type of situation, the employer "has intention-
ally created an atmosphere of coercion in which employees cannot
be expected to perceive the distinction between the employer's
with employer, and for making public statements in support of the employer is lawful);
Sibilio's Golden Grill, Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1688 (1977) (discharge of supervisor for engaging in
union activity while concerned only with advancing her own job interests rather than with
vindicating employee rights or refusing to impinge on those rights is lawful); Karl Kristof-
ferson and Sigvald Kristofferson, Co-partners, 184 N.L.R.B. 159 (1970) (supervisor's partici-
pation in concerted union activity is inconsistent with his supervisory status).
35. See Stop and Go Foods, 246 N.L.R.B. at 1076.
36. 248 N.L.R.B. at 828.
37. For the text of § 8(a)(1), see supra note 16.
38. DRW Corp., 248 N.R.L.B. at 828.
39. Id. at 828-29.
40. Id. at 829.
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right to prohibit union activity among supervisors and their right
to engage freely in such activities themselves." '41 Therefore, the co-
ercive effect on employees resulting from the supervisor's discharge
is not unavoidable and incidental to the discharge of an unpro-
tected individual. As a result, the remedy required to fully dissi-
pate this coercive effect is the restoration of the status quo ante.
The Board felt this could not be fully accomplished without the
reinstatement of all affected individuals, including supervisors.42
The Board was again careful to point out that findings of vio-
lations in supervisory discharge cases are premised on the vindica-
tion of employees' section 7 rights, not on protection of the super-
visor.43 It is not the discharge of a supervisor for engaging in union
activity that violates the Act. Rather, the violation in DRW Corp.
was that the employer discharged the supervisor and then used
this as an example and a threat to employees of what would hap-
pen to them if they supported the union.44 This conduct suggested
that the employer's true motive for the discharge was a desire to
interfere with the union activity of his employees, not a desire to
punish his supervisor for disloyalty. This conduct was therefore a
violation of the Act since it was a major component in the em-
ployer's overall scheme aimed at coercing employees in the exercise
of their section 7 rights.45
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 830.
44. Id. at 828. See also Sheraton P.R. Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. 867 (1980), enforcement
denied, NLRB v. Sheraton P.R. Corp., 651 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1981). There, seven supervisors
and four employees were discharged for their participation in the production and distribu-
tion of a letter to the company's president complaining of the working conditions and sug-
gesting that the problems could be alleviated by replacing the General Manager. Soon there-
after, the General Manager sent a letter to all employees emphasizing that the supervisors
had been discharged for criticizing local management and participating in the letter, and
implying that all employees could anticipate a similar penalty if they engaged in such activ-
ity. The Board held the discharges unlawful because they, together with the follow-up letter,
clearly worked (as they were intended to) to discourage employees from exercising the rights
guaranteed them by the Act. 248 N.L.R.B. at 867-68. The First Circuit, however, stated that
the case was a dispute "among managerial employees into which several non-supervisory
employees were drawn," and that there was no substantial evidence of interference with the
§ 7 rights of the other employees. 651 F.2d at 54.
45. DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. at 828.
1983]
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II. PARKER-ROBB
The pattern of conduct line of cases covered a span of fifteen
years. The Board erased this long line of precedent in Parker-Robb
Chevrolet, Inc.,4 decided June 23, 1982."7 This case overruled all
decisions which in any way followed the "integral part" or "pattern
of conduct" test.48 It held that the employer's motive was irrele-
vant to the issue, and that the discharge of a supervisor is always
lawful unless it falls under one of the three narrow well-established
exceptions.49
The supervisor in Parker-Robb was discharged after he got
into a heated discussion with his superior concerning the dis-
charges of three employees who had been involved in an organiza-
tional meeting of the union.50 The administrative law judge relied
on DRW Corp. and found this discharge to be part of the em-
ployer's overall plan to discourage its employees' support of the
union, and therefore unlawful.51 The Board disagreed with this
conclusion, and held that the supervisor's discharge was lawful.2
The Board initially stated that the discharge of a supervisor
violates the Act when it interferes with the exercise of employees'
46. 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 110 L.R.R.M. 1289 (June 23, 1982).
47. A significant number of cases were decided soon thereafter in reliance upon Parker-
Robb. See Diaz Enters., Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 111 L.R.R.M. 1299 (Sept. 27, 1982); Bent-
ley Hedges Travel Servs., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 111 L.R.R.M. 1238 (Sept. 21, 1982);
Boro Management Corp., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 111 L.R.R.M. 1029 (Aug. 16, 1982); Roma
Baking Co., 263 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 110 L.R.R.M. 1523 (July 30, 1982); Rain-Ware, Inc., 263
N.L.R.B. No. 8, 111 L.R.R.M. 1004 (July 30, 1982).
48. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1292 n.20. In this footnote, the Board specifically overruled ten of
the pattern of conduct cases and then generally expanded this to overrule all of them. It
stated: "To the extent that they are inconsistent with our decision here today, [these ten
cases], and other decisions following the 'integral part' or 'pattern of conduct' line of cases
are hereby overruled." Id.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
50. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1294 (Member Jenkins, concurring). The supervisor, crew chief
Terry Doss, along with another crew chief, attended an organizational meeting of the union.
Doss engaged in no other union activities, and declined to sign an authorization card. The
day after this meeting the three employees were fired. Upon learning of this, Doss went to
the Used Car Sales Manager to find out why, since he felt one of the men was "among the
best men we've got in the place." Id. at 1289. The Used Car Sales Manager said they had to
cut back. Doss then went to the New Car Sales Manager and received the same response. Id.
The two then got into a heated discussion and used obscenities. The Manager then informed
Doss that he, too, was discharged. Id. at 1294. (Member Jenkins, concurring).
51. See id. at 1290.
52. Id.
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section 7 rights.53 However, it severely limited this proposition by
holding that this only occurs when a supervisor is discharged for
testifying at a Board hearing, refusing to commit an unfair labor
practice, or failing to prevent unionization.5 4 The Board insisted
that the pattern of conduct cases unduly extended this principle,
yet it gave no clear explanation as to why the interference with
employee rights in the pattern of conduct cases was any different
than the interference caused by discharges falling within one of
these three narrow categories. Instead it merely stated that the
pattern of conduct cases tended to protect supervisors who them-
selves participated in union activity.5 5 It also stated that the pat-
tern of conduct test resulted in inconsistent decisions leaving no
clear guidelines as to when supervisors may and may not be law-
fully discharged, and that this resulted in conflict with the 1947
amendments which expressly excluded supervisors from the pro-
tections of the Act.56 The confusion was deemed to stem from an
improper extension of the rationale of Pioneer Drilling,57 which
the Board stated was a unique factual situation whose rationale
should not be applied to supervisory discharge cases.58
After stating that a supervisory discharge should be held un-
lawful if it interferes with employees' rights, the Board asserted
that the pattern of conduct cases disregarded "the fact that em-
ployees, but not supervisors, are protected against discharges for
engaging in union or concerted activities." '59 However, the Board
seemingly ignored the whole premise of the pattern of conduct
cases which were directed towards the vindication of employee
53. Id. at 1293-94.
54. Id. at 1290.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1290-91. See also supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
58. Parker-Robb, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291 n.12. The Board felt that the peculiar custom of
the drilling industry, whereby the termination of a supervisor also resulted in the termina-
tion of his crew, made Pioneer Drilling a "novel" case whose holding should have been
strictly limited to its unique facts. Id. However, this summary disposition of Pioneer Drill-
ing ignores the fact that the supervisory discharge was held illegal solely because it was used
by the employer as a means of interfering with the employees' protected rights. Thus, de-
spite its peculiar custom or "novel" facts, Pioneer Drilling stands for the proposition that
an employer may not intentionally discharge a supervisor and thereby interfere with the
protected rights of employees. Since this is the precise concern of the pattern of conduct
cases, the Board's statement that these cases were an improper extension of Pioneer Drill-
ing cannot be justified.
59. Id. at 1291 (emphasis original).
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rights, not the protection of supervisors.
Relying upon its statement that the discharge of a supervisor
"is not unlawful for the simple reason that employees, but not su-
pervisors, have rights protected by the Act,"60 the Board then re-
jected the use of a motive test for these cases. It argued that since
the discharge is itself lawful, an employer's motive or expectation
as to its effect on employees is irrelevant to the issue, since this
cannot change the character of this otherwise lawful conduct."1
Even if the employer later used this discharge to threaten employ-
ees, this would not alter the lawfulness of the discharge itself. In
such a case, the Board felt the discharge and the threat should be
considered separately. The threat would be a section 8(a)(1) viola-
tion, but the discharge would still be lawful, and therefore, the ap-
propriate remedy should be a cease and desist order, not reinstate-
ment of the supervisor.62
This argument that a supervisory discharge is of itself lawful,
thereby rendering a motive test irrelevant, results in a logical in-
consistency with the Board's prior statement that supervisory dis-
charges which fall into one of the three narrow exceptions will be
held unlawful.6 3 The rationale behind these exceptions is that in
certain circumstances the discharge of a supervisor does unlawfully
interfere with employee rights. In order to make this determina-
tion the Board occasionally must, at least implicitly, make an in-
quiry into the employer's motive. For example, if a supervisor is
discharged shortly after refusing to commit an unfair labor prac-
tice, the employer is unlikely to admit that this refusal was the
reason for the discharge. Instead it will argue that the discharge
was the result of some other factor, such as economic necessity, a
need to cut back, or even disloyalty. Since a supervisor may law-
fully be discharged for any of these reasons, a faithful adherence to
Parker-Robb would result in the Board finding no violation of the
Act in this case. In order to classify this case under one of the
exceptions, and thereby find the discharge unlawful, the Board
would have to disregard the employer's stated justification, inquire
into his true motivation, and conclude that the true purpose or
motivating factor behind the discharge was a desire to get rid of
60. Id. at 1292.
61. Id. at 1291.
62. See id. at 1291 n.19.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
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the supervisor for refusing to commit the unfair labor practice. In
finding a violation the Board would therefore be holding that the
actual motive was to discharge the supervisor for refusing to carry
out the employer's desire to unlawfully interfere with employee
rights. This intention to interfere with the employees' exercise of
their protected rights is precisely the motive which the pattern of
conduct cases held unlawful, and which Parker-Robb now ironi-
cally declares irrelevant.
Member Jenkins, concurring in the result of Parker-Robb"
but dissenting in regard to the overruling of the pattern of conduct
cases and the elimination of the motive test, posed a strong argu-
ment that Parker-Robb was not even a pattern of conduct type of
case, and was therefore an improper vehicle for overruling this long
line of cases. Jenkins found no evidence to suggest that the super-
visor's discharge was contemplated by the employer prior to the
other discharges of employees. Instead, the evidence showed that
the supervisor was discharged solely for using obscenities while en-
gaging in a heated discussion with his superior. 5 There was no evi-
dence that his discharge was aimed at penalizing employees, a ploy
to facilitate or cover up the unlawful discharge of employees, or
even in furtherance of an unlawful plan to rid the employer's facil-
ity of all union adherents. 6 In Jenkins' view the discharge was law-
ful because no violation was shown under the pattern of conduct
test. However, he saw no reason to abandon fifteen years of settled
Board precedent.
III. BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
Parker-Robb and the pattern of conduct theory both stress
two things: (1) that the Act's protections extend only to employ-
ees, not to supervisors; and (2) that the discharge of a supervisor
should only be held unlawful if it interferes with the employees'
exercise of their protected rights. The major conflicts revolve
around when employee rights are unlawfully interfered with,
whether motive is the proper test, and what the appropriate rem-
edy is. These conflicts result from an attempt to balance the some-
times competing rights of employers and employees, namely the
64. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1294-96 (Member Jenkins, concurring).
65. Id. at 1294 (Member Jenkins, concurring).
66. Id. at 1295 (Member Jenkins, concurring).
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employer's right to demand loyalty from its management person-
nel 7 and the employees' right to engage in protected activity free
from interference by the employer. 8
The proper standard for governing the area of supervisory dis-
charges must be one which takes account of these competing inter-
ests and accommodates both to the fullest extent possible. Parker-
Robb, however, focused solely on the employer's interests by insist-
ing that any inquiry into the potential illegality of a supervisory
discharge be foreclosed if the supervisor had been engaging in
union activity. This blanket rule ignores the interests of the em-
ployees. It also fails to recognize that if an employer desires to use
a supervisory discharge to interfere with employee rights, the dis-
charge of a pro-union supervisor is the most effective means of ac-
complishing this. By discharging a pro-union supervisor, the em-
ployer is then able to hold this out to the employees as an example
of what will happen to them if they engage in union activity. 9 The
employer can convey this threat by continually emphasizing to the
employees that the supervisor was fired for union activity. By thus
blurring the distinction between the employees' protected right to
engage in union activity and the supervisor's lack of similar protec-
tion, the employer can effectively use this discharge to restrain the
employees in the exercise of their rights. The fact that the em-
ployer is trying to interfere with employee rights, not punish his
pro-union supervisor for disloyalty, suggests that this is the proper
issue in these cases, not merely whether or not the supervisor was
pro-union.
Congress' main purpose for excluding supervisors from the
,protection of the Act was to grant to employers the right to de-
mand the undivided loyalty of their management personnel, such
loyalty being deemed inconsistent with union membership. 70 This
exclusion must be read in accordance with the overall goals of the
Act in general which were to protect the rights of employees to
organize and engage in collective activity, to eliminate obstructions
to the free flow of commerce, and to promote industrial peace. 1
The Act itself is first and foremost. The later exclusion of supervi-
67. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
68. See supra note 16 for §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 36-45. See also supra note 44.
70. See supra notes 14 & 15.
71. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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sors from its coverage must be read in relation to the Act's primary
goals. One of these goals is the protection of the employees' right
to engage in union activities free from interference by the em-
ployer.7 2 Even though supervisors are excluded from the Act, this
does not mean that employers can use them to interfere with the
other employees' rights. Section 8(a)(1) still prohibits this."
The Board recognized this in Parker-Robb by holding that the
discharge of a supervisor may violate the Act in certain narrow cir-
cumstances.74 It also recognized that supervisory discharges cannot
be held unlawful every time they have any kind of incidental effect
on employee rights. To do so would be tantamount to holding un-
lawful every discharge of a supervisor with pro-union sympathies,
even if the employer acted in good faith, since any time anyone is
fired employees are likely to fear that they will suffer the same fate
if they engage in similar conduct.7 5 This would destroy the em-
ployer's right to demand loyalty from its supervisors by taking
away its right to discharge them even when union activity and dis-
loyalty actually were the motives for the discharge. Such a result
would, in effect, indirectly bring supervisors under the protection
of the Act.
This is precisely what the Board felt was happening in the
pattern of conduct cases. And, in fact, a number of the pattern of
conduct cases did come close to doing this, and they were properly
overruled by Parker-Robbe.7 However, by classifying all of the pat-
tern of conduct cases in this way, and overruling all of them,
Parker-Robb went too far. If supervisory discharges falling under
72. Id. See also §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Act, supra note 16.
73. See supra note 16.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
75. See Oil City Brass Works, 357 F.2d at 470.
76. See VADA of Okla., Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 750 (1975) (supervisor who was involved in
union campaign was discharged along with 38 employees); Downslope Indus., Inc., 246
N.L.R.B. 948 (1979) (supervisor and all employees discharged for protesting about actions of
a plant manager); Nevis Indus., Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1979) (successor corporation taking
over another business refused to retain any unionized employees or their supervisor because
it wanted to be non-union).
In each of these cases the discharge of the supervisors was held unlawful. However, while
the discharge of the employees for engaging in union or concerted activity was in fact unlaw-
ful, the discharge of the supervisors for engaging in this same concerted activity was entirely
within the employer's rights and should have been held lawful. The discharge of the pro-
union supervisor in each case may have had an incidental effect on the employees, but the
employer did nothing to increase this incidental interference.
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one of the three categories discussed in Parker-Robb77 are held to
unlawfully interfere with employee rights, then why, in appropriate
pattern of conduct cases, should supervisory discharges used by
employers to interfere with employee rights not also be unlawful?
Employers should not be allowed to take advantage of the fact
that supervisors may be discharged for union activity by using
these discharges as a means of interfering with employees' pro-
tected rights. Where the relevant facts create a strong inference
that the supervisory discharge was used as a weapon by the em-
ployer to strike at employees, the discharge should be an auto-
matic violation of the Act, just as in the three categories accepted
by Parker-Robb. This would cover cases such as those mentioned
above 7  where an employer discharges a pro-union supervisor
under the guise of disloyalty, and then uses this discharge as an
example and a threat to employees. This subsequent use of the
discharge creates a very strong inference that the discharge was
the initial part of a plan designed to coerce and restrain employees
in the exercise of their protected rights. Although the supervisor
could be fired for union activity, and although the employees
should know this, the employer in this type of case has intention-
ally created an atmosphere where employees can no longer reason-
ably be expected to make this distinction.7 9 A discharge under
these circumstances must be held to violate the Act. Similarly, a
supervisory discharge should be automatically unlawful if the facts
strongly suggest it was used as a ploy to facilitate or cover up the
taking of unlawful action against employees, as was the case in Pi-
oneer Drilling.8"
The potential conflict between the employer's right to demand
loyalty from its supervisors and the employee's right to engage in
protected activity free from interference by the employer requires
that supervisory discharge cases be governed by a standard capable
of accommodating both of these interests. An absolute statement,
as in Parker-Robb, that supervisors are unprotected by the Act,
77. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
78. See supra text accompanying note 69.
79. See DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. at 829.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. Another technique for covering up the
unlawful discharge of an employee is to discharge a few other employees or supervisors




and may therefore be discharged for any reason or purpose, regard-
less of the intended effect on employees,"1 grants too much to the
employer at the expense of the employees. In contrast, a procedure
which finds every discharge of a pro-union supervisor unlawful be-
cause of the incidental effect this may have on the employees
would virtually work to deprive the employer of his acknowledged
right to demand loyalty from his supervisors.8 2 A compromise be-
tween these two extremes, which recognizes the employer's right to
demand loyalty while still prohibiting employers from intentionally
using a supervisory discharge as a weapon against the rights of em-
ployees, would best serve to accommodate these often competing
interests of employer and employee.
When the relevant facts surrounding a supervisory discharge
strongly suggest that the employer's action was indeed taken to
punish the supervisor for disloyalty, not to somehow interfere with
employee rights, the discharge must be held lawful. An employer
has the right to demand loyalty from his supervisors, including the
right to punish or discharge them for engaging in union activity.83
However, where the relevant facts create a strong inference that
the employer was using the supervisory discharge as a technique
for interfering with employee rights," the discharge should be an
automatic violation of the Act. Such uses of supervisory discharges
constitute clear and direct interference with employee rights.
Holding unlawful this intentional infliction of harm upon employ-
ees is entirely consistent with the Act and its amendments. In
these situations the fact that supervisors are not protected by the
Act is irrelevant because the employees who suffer the harm are
protected. The mere fact that a non-protected individual is used as
the conduit through which this harm is inflicted should not detract
from the fact that rights protected by the Act have been violated.
Where, as in the above instances, the relevant facts are suffi-
81. While the Parker-Robb decision purports to hold that the discharge of a supervisor
is unlawful when it interferes with employees' § 7 rights, by limiting this only to cases where
the discharge was for giving adverse testimony at a Board hearing, or for refusing to commit
unfair labor practices, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291-92, the Board renders this partial holding virtu-
ally meaningless.
82. See supra text accompanying note 75. A number of the pattern of conduct cases
seem to have been decided on virtually the same standard and, as such, were properly over-
ruled by Parker-Robb. See supra note 76.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
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cient for determining the true purpose of the discharge, a formal
inquiry into the motive of the employer need not be undertaken.
However, in cases where the facts do not on their face lead to a
conclusion one way or the other as to what the employer was at-
tempting to achieve, some type of formal motive test should be
employed to make this determination. Typically the employer in
such cases acts upon mixed motives, that is, a desire to punish the
supervisor for disloyalty together with the hope or expectation that
this action will deter union activity among the employees in gen-
eral. Consequently, the appropriate test is one which inquires into
which of these two motives was the dominant one influencing the
employer's action.
IV. DETERMINING WHEN VIOLATIONS HAVE OCCURRED: THE
THREE STAGE DOMINANT MOTIVE TEST
Presently, the Board applies the shifting burden of proof stan-
dard set forth in Wright Lines' to all dual motive cases arising
under sections 8(a)(1)8 " and 8(a)(3).8 7 Under this test, there must
first be a prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference
that interference with protected conduct was a "motivating fac-
tor"88 in the employer's decision. Once this is established, the bur-
den shifts to the employer to demonstrate, as an affirmative de-
fense, that he would have taken the same action even in the
absence of the protected conduct.8 9
In the supervisory discharge context, this test would first re-
quire that there be a showing sufficient to support the inference
that interference with employees' section 7 rights, and the squelch-
ing of union activity, was a "motivating factor" in the employer's
decision to discharge the supervisor. Once this was established, the
discharge would be held unlawful unless the employer could
85. Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980).
86. While motivation is not ordinarily considered in discussing violations of § 8(a)(1),
there have been 8(a)(1) cases where the Board found it necessary to inquire into motive. See
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 372 U.S. 405 (1964); Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp., 224
N.L.R.B. 574 (1976).
87. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization ...... NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1976).




demonstrate that he would have discharged the supervisor even if
he knew this action would have no substantial effect on the em-
ployees' exercise of their section 7 rights. In other words, for his
action to be held lawful, the employer would have to show that he
discharged the supervisor for the legitimate and lawful purpose of
assuring the loyalty of his management personnel, and not for the
unlawful purpose of using this discharge as a weapon against em-
ployees, or as a conduit for getting at employees and coercing them
in the exercise of their protected rights.
The Wright Line test involves a number of problems which
would limit the effectiveness of its use for analysis of mixed-motive
supervisory discharge cases. Most significantly, Wright Line would
make it very difficult ever to prove a violation because the em-
ployer would always be able to come up with a "valid" reason for
the discharge even if an invalid one could also be shown. By failing
to provide a formal framework for an attack of the employer's as-
serted justification, Wright Line weights the balance too much on
the employer's side and frustrates attempts to delve into a true
analysis of the employer's dominant motive.
To remedy this problem, a true dominant motive test should
be applied to mixed-motive supervisory discharge cases. Such a
test would have three components, the first two of which would be
the same as in Wright Line. First, there would have to be a show-
ing that protected conduct was a motivating factor in the em-
ployer's decision. Second, the burden would shift to the employer
to state a legitimate reason for the discharge, and to show that this
was the main factor leading to his decision. Finally, after the em-
ployer's justification, the third component would shift the burden
back to the NLRB General Counsel to introduce evidence aimed at
showing the employer's justification was merely a guise or a pre-
text, and that interference with protected employee rights was re-
ally the main motive for the discharge.9 0 Such evidence could in-
90. This three-step, shifting burden of proof, dominant motive test would operate in
much the same way as the test for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
operates in the employment discrimination context. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. Law No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 USC §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)). Under the intent test
for alleged Title VII violations, the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case by set-
ting forth facts suggestive of discrimination based on race or sex. The second stage is the
rebuttal, where the employer must articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
his actions. The third and final stage is the sur-rebuttal, where the plaintiff tries to show
that the employer's reason is a mere pretext, that is, the stated reason is not the real reason.
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clude a showing that the discharge occurred in connection with
numerous unfair labor practices and other interference with em-
ployee rights. It could also include a showing that the employer
actually rehired the discharged supervisors after it got rid of the
employees it wanted to get rid of or achieved the desired effect. 1
Or, if it could be shown that the supervisor had never even en-
gaged in union activity, or if he did, that the employer had no
knowledge of this,92 this could be used to contradict an employer's
assertion that it discharged the supervisor for disloyalty.
At the conclusion of this three stage inquiry, the Board would
make its determination as to whether the dominant motive of the
employer was the lawful one of punishing a supervisor for disloy-
alty, or the unlawful one of attempting to restrain employees in the
exercise of their protected rights. This dominant motive test would
preserve the employer's right to discharge supervisors for disloy-
alty when this action is taken in good faith, while also preserving
the employees' right to be free from intentional interference with
their protected conduct. In contrast, the Board's complete elimina-
tion of the motive test in Parker-Robb virtually authorizes employ-
ers to use supervisors as weapons if they see fit, and intentionally
to discharge supervisors for the purpose of interfering with the em-
ployees' exercise of their protected rights. While an inquiry into
the subjective intent of employers may be a difficult procedure, the
Board should not turn its back on these cases merely because they
may be difficult to resolve.9 3
V. THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Even when the discharge of a supervisor is found unlawfully to
interfere with protected employee rights, the question still remains
as to whether the reinstatement of the supervisor is a necessary
and proper remedy. Section 10(c) of the Act states that when an
employer commits an unfair labor practice the Board should issue
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
91. See Pioneer Drilling, 162 N.L.R.B. at 918. See also Donelson Packing Co., 220
N.L.R.B. 1043 (1975) (employer offered to rehire the supervisor just seven weeks after he
discharged him for supposedly being incompetent).
92. See, e.g., Fairview Nursing Home, 202 N.L.R.B. 318 (1973) (supervisor had signed a
union card but there was no evidence that the employer had any knowledge of his pro-union
sympathies).
93. See Parker-Robb, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1295 (Member Jenkins, concurring).
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a cease and desist order, and should also take such affirmative ac-
tion, including reinstatement of employees, as will effectuate the
policies of the Act.9 4 The key to finding the discharge of a supervi-
sor unlawful is a finding that the discharge interfered with the pro-
tected rights of employees. Since the policies of the Act include
preventing unfair labor practices and protecting employee rights,
the remedy in this area should be one which effectuates these
goals.
The first possibility would be to issue a cease and desist order
with nothing more. This is what the Board in Parker-Robb sug-
gested as the appropriate remedy even where the employer used
the supervisor's discharge to threaten and coerce employees. 95
While this would prohibit the employer from engaging in such un-
lawful conduct in the future and in that sense would work to pro-
tect employee rights, a cease and desist order would do nothing to
eliminate the already present coercive effect on the employees' ex-
ercise of their protected rights. It is therefore clear that this only
lays the foundation for the total remedy and that more is required.
The second possibility would be to require the posting of a full
explanatory notice in an attempt to eliminate this coercive effect
on employee rights.96 Such a notice would be directed to all em-
ployees and would clearly state that the NLRB has found that the
employer committed an unfair labor practice by discharging the
supervisor in order to interfere with employee rights. It would then
have to explain fully that the employees are free to engage in
union or concerted activities and that they may not be disciplined
in any way for such activity.97
Although this would help to eliminate the coercive effect on
94. NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
95. 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291 n.19.
96. It is standard practice for the Board to require employers to post some type of
informational notice at its offices and plants when the employer is found to have committed
an unfair labor practice. Generally this notice is drawn up by the Board and attached as an
Appendix at the end of the decision in the case. For some examples of this, see VADA of
Okla., Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. at 765; Fairview Nursing Home, 202 N.L.R.B. at 326; Krebs &
King Toyota, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. at 465.
97. This type of full explanatory notice would be much more extensive than the usual
informational notice. The standard informational notice, which the Board generally requires
an employer to post, usually consists only of a listing of the specific unfair labor practices
found, coupled with a statement by the employer that he will no longer commit these prac-
tices, and that he will reinstate, with backpay, all personnel who were unlawfully discharged.
For examples, see supra note 96.
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the employees, it may not be totally removed since this remedy
does not include the simultaneous reinstatement of the discharged
supervisor. To remedy this problem, the notice would have to ex-
plain that since supervisors are not protected, and since the Act is
designed to protect employee rights only, the supervisor was not
entitled to reinstatement. The notice should then reiterate that
this in no way is meant to restrict the previous statement that the
employees are free to engage in union activities without fear of be-
ing disciplined for this.
This remedy would serve to both protect employee rights and
eliminate much of the coercive effect caused by the unlawful dis-
charge. It would also stop short of actually reinstating the dis-
charged supervisor, an act which many find objectionable 8 Never-
theless, this remedy involves some problems which limit its ability
to fully effectuate the policies of the Act. First, there is no signifi-
cant deterrent factor since the employer need only post this notice,
and since he may continue to reap the benefits from any remaining
effect on employees as a result of the coercive atmosphere he origi-
nally created. As such, the goal of the Act to prevent similar unfair
labor practices in the future may not be effectuated.
Second, this remedy may not be a fully effective means of ad-
vising employees of their rights and eliminating the coercive atmo-
sphere. It is not unreasonable to suggest that many employees will
never actually read such a posted notice. Moreover, even those who
do read it may not fully understand it. Unless the notice is ex-
tremely clear it may not serve the purpose of eliminating the coer-
cive effect on the employees. Since it is the employer who inten-
tionally created this "pervasive atmosphere of coercion,"9' it is
reasonable to impose upon him a remedy with a greater likelihood
of eliminating this condition.
Consequently, the remedy which would appear to most fully
effectuate the policies of the Act is reinstatement of the unlawfully
discharged supervisor.100 A complete return to the status quo
98. See, e.g., Parker-Robb, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1291 n.13; see also Brod, The NLRB in
Search of a Standard: When Is the Discharge of a Supervisor in Connection with Employ-
ees' Union or Other Protected Activities an Unfair Labor Practice?, 14 IND. L. REv. 727
(1981); Lederer, Management's Right to Loyalty of Supervisors, 32 LAB. L.J. 83 (1981);
Note, Discharge of Supervisors for Union Activism: DRW Corp., 22 B.C.L. REv. 60 (1980).
99. DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. at 829.
100. Section 10(c) speaks only of the reinstatement of "employees." However, given the
fact that the Board has the power to provide any remedy which is necessary to effectuate
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ante 011 would, to a greater extent than the other remedies, serve to
eliminate the prevailing coercive atmosphere, protect employees in
the exercise of their protected rights, and prevent similar unfair
labor practices in the future. The reinstatement of the supervisor
would affirmatively demonstrate to the employees that the em-
ployer cannot get away with committing unfair labor practices, and
that he cannot lawfully interfere with their protected rights. This
demonstration should help to convince the employees that their
rights are indeed protected, and that the employer truly cannot
interfere with their section 7 rights to engage in union activity. In
this way, it should eliminate the coercive effect of the illegal dis-
charge to the greatest possible extent. Ordering reinstatement of
supervisors in these cases will also act as a much greater deterrent
on the employer since he will realize that the status quo ante will
be restored and that in the long run he will gain nothing. This will
further the policy of preventing similar unfair labor practices in
the future.
It is not known whether or not the discharged supervisor will
in each case accept reinstatement. Even if reinstatement is ac-
cepted, it is not certain what the supervisor's future with the firm
will be.102 However, these are problems which simply must be ac-
cepted in a system where the types of remedies available are some-
what restricted.10 3 Given the available choices, reinstatement of the
unlawfully discharged supervisor is the best remedy in these types
some fundamental policy of the Act, the reinstatement of supervisors must also be seen as
an available remedy for use within the Board's discretion. D. McDowELL & K. HUHN, NLRB
REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 114 (1976).
101. DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. at 829.
102. It must be noted that the Board will, of course, be deciding these cases on a case-
by-case basis. As such, in any given case, if the Board feels the supervisor's disloyalty was a
significant motive for the discharge (although not the dominant motive), it remains free to
find a violation, yet devise some remedy other than reinstatement which it feels will appro-
priately effectuate the policies of the Act. Similarly, the Board is free to make a determina-
tion of whether reinstatement of the supervisor will serve any real purpose in each specific
case. Where there is the possibility of a disloyalty problem after the reinstatement, it must
be remembered that if the supervisor continues to engage in union activity the employer is
free to fire him for this, so long as this renewed activity is the basis for the dismissal, and
not retaliation or a desire to later use this discharge as a weapon against other employees.
103. Perhaps where the supervisor was pro-union and where there truly exists a loyalty
problem, the Board might want to order the employer to hire back the supervisor as a regu-
lar employee (where feasible, and acceptable to the ex-supervisor), but still require that he




It is argued, however, that reinstating supervisors in such
cases comes perilously close to extending the protections of the Act
to supervisors, thereby defeating Congress' action in excluding
them from the protection of the Act.11 5 However, it is difficult to
see how reinstatement of the supervisor does this any more than
finding a violation in the first place. It is also argued that there
exists the greater danger of employers losing the right to demand
and rely upon the loyalty of their supervisors.106 By focusing
mainly on the supervisors themselves, rather than on the employ-
ees whose rights have been violated, both of these arguments miss
the point. The policy of reinstating supervisors is not premised on
protecting the supervisor himself, since he has no rights under the
Act to protect. Rather, this remedy is aimed at protecting employ-
ees from actions designed to coerce them in the exercise of their
section 7 rights, and protecting employees from such coercion is a
primary obligation of the Board. 10 7 This remedy does not extend
the protection of the Act to supervisors; supervisors remain unpro-
tected and may still be lawfully discharged for union activity and
disloyalty whenever this is the legitimate operative motive of the
employer.
The availability of this proposed remedy for the discharged
supervisor would not endanger the employers right to demand and
rely upon the loyalty of their supervisors. The employer remains
absolutely free to demand the loyalty of his supervisory personnel.
He also remains free to discharge a supervisor at any time for dis-
loyalty or for engaging in union activity. What the employer may
not do is intentionally discharge a supervisor, or intentionally use
this discharge, to unlawfully interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. The result is
merely a removal of this potentially powerful weapon from the em-
ployer's still formidable anti-union arsenal.
104. This is evidenced by a hypothetical case in which an employer discharges a pro-
union supervisor and then uses this discharge as an example and a threat to employees of
what fate will befall them if they engage in union activity. Assuming no other employees
were discharged, how could the coercive atmosphere created by the employer be better elim-
inated than by ordering the reinstatement of the unlawfully discharged supervisor?
105. See Parker-Robb, 110 L.R.R.M. at 1289; DRW Corp., 248 N.L.R.B. at 828 (Mem-
ber Truesdale, dissenting).
106. Lederer, supra note 98, at 103.




One of the NLRB's primary responsibilities under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act is the protection of the employees' right
to engage in union and concerted activity.' When an employer
discharges a supervisor for the purpose of infringing upon these
protected rights the Board should act in accordance with its re-
sponsibilities, declare this action unlawful, and order the remedy
which is most effective at eliminating the coercive effect of this un-
lawful action. The complete overruling of the pattern of conduct
line of cases and the elimination of a motive test are inconsistent
with this responsibility. Such drastic action is not necessary to pre-
serve the employer's right to demand loyalty from its management
personnel.
While Parker-Robb has been hailed for its "forthright ap-
proach" to supervisory discharge cases, 109 the fact remains that the
decision virtually authorizes employers to use the discharge of su-
pervisors as a weapon against employees. This will have the effect
of allowing employers another means for restricting employees in
the full exercise of their protected statutory rights. A refinement
and clarification of the "pattern of conduct" theory would seem to
be a better course of action than merely ignoring the difficulties of
this problem and exposing the rights of employees to potential
infringement.
In most cases the discharge of a supervisor is a lawful and le-
gitimate exercise of the employer's rights. However, where the
facts surrounding the discharge create a strong inference that the
employer intended to interfere with employee rights, the discharge
should automatically be held a violation of the Act. The best ex-
ample of this occurs when an employer discharges a supervisor and
uses this as a threat to the employees. 1 0 An employer should not
be free to interfere directly with the employees' protected rights
simply because the weapon he chooses to use is a non-protected
supervisor.
Where the facts do not create such a strong inference of ille-
gality, a three-stage dominant motive test should be used to deter-
108. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
109. Brod, The NLRB Changes Its Policy On the Legality of an Employer's Discharge
of a Disloyal Supervisor, 34 LAB. L.J. 13, 19 (1983).
110. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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mine whether or not the employer was attempting to unlawfully
interfere with employee rights. This test would provide the oppor-
tunity for an attack upon the employer's asserted justification and
would thereby provide a formal framework to take account of the
interests of the employees. It would also protect the interests of
the employer by preserving the right to discharge supervisors for
disloyalty whenever the facts support the conclusion that this mo-
tive predominated. By adopting this type of framework the Board
could eliminate some of the confusion surrounding the analysis of
supervisory discharge cases, without taking the extreme route of
Parker-Robb and completely ignoring the rights of employees.
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